I study the long-term impact of class identity (chengfen) on individuals' income and households' wealth in urban China using Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data.
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I. Introduction
In the 1950s, the communist government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched the movement of expropriation of merchants and capitalists and nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises in urban China. This movement led to substantial homogeneity of income and consumption in cities (Lee and Selden, 2007) . The homogeneity sustain to late 1970s and early 1980s when the income inequality measured by gini coefficient is around 0.17 in urban China (Ravallion and Chen 2007, Wang 2008) . The government also assigned an inheritable class identity (chengfen) that was considered permanent to each family and implemented discriminatory policies based on class identities. Their intention was to reprimand affluent citizens who were thought to be gaining wealth by exploiting others, while rewarding both citizens who were considered exploited and citizens who supported the socialist revolution.
The main determinants of a family's class status were the source of income, job type, and political status of the member of the family in the years prior to the formation of PRC in 1949. There were four broad status categories: 1) the revolutionary class, which includes revolutionary cadres, member of the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and army men; 2) the poor class, which includes poor or landless peasants, lower-middle-income peasants and industrial workers; 3) the middle class, which includes upper-and middle-income peasants, office workers, petty proprietors, teachers, and professionals; 4) the rich class or the exploiting class, which includes rich peasants, landlords and capitalists who earned land or capital rents (Deng and Treiman, 1997) .
Before abolition of the class system, the family class background was officially recorded within the household registration (hukou) of each family, and was required to be reported on any application for schools, jobs, and promotion. In addition, a 3 family's class status was made public within their local community and to friends and relatives outside their community, which fostered discrimination within social settings.
Prior to its official abolition in 1979, family class origins were vitally important political labels for each individual throughout the Maoist era (Huang, 1995; Unger, 1982; Watson, 1984; Zhang, 1998) . Rich and middle class families were discriminated in many aspects, including education, employment, and admission into the armed forces and the CCP. Li (2003) , Zhou et al. (1998) , Sato and Li (2007, 2008) and Zhang (1998) all find strong correlations between family class origins and educational achievements. Sato and Li (2007) show that CCP membership is affected by family class origins in rural China. There are also studies that discuss the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status such as official position, marriage, and fertility in China (Campbell and Lee, 2003, 2006; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Ting, 2004) . However, there are few studies on the intergenerational transmission of wealth in China. The radical institutional change after 1949 depleted the capital of affluent families and led to substantial homogeneity of income and consumption in cities (Lee and Selden, 2007) . The homogeneity sustained to late 1970s and early 1980s when the income inequality measured by gini coefficient is only around 0.17 in urban China (Ravallion and Chen, 2007; . Further, class-based discrimination is known to negatively influence member into the CCP and educational achievements, which are expected to increase income potential. Because of the expropriation and the subsequent discrimination, it might be expected that the descendents of the previously better-off families are not economically better off than the formerly poor.
Contrary to expectation, using data of China Household Income Project (CHIP) survey data in 2002, Sato and Li (2007) demonstrate that descendents of the poor class continue to possess relatively less capital than those of rich peasants and 4 landlords in rural China. In fact, after controlling for the education of the male household heads and CCP membership, the results remain the same. Results of a similar study in rural Hungary, by Szelényi (1988) indicate that the 'peasant entrepreneurs' capitalizing on the opening of the markets in the 1970s are statistically more likely to be the decedents of well-off and entrepreneurial families before their political and economic transformation. One might believe that status and wealth is more difficult to change in a rural area due to the relatively isolated economic environment and slow economic development. In addition, given the large migration to urban areas in the PRC the true entrepreneurs may have left. This paper discusses whether there is any long-run impact of the wealth redistribution associated with class status on the economic outcomes of urban residents in the PRC. And if so, how large is this effect? Urban and rural areas of China are very different in many aspects. The market economy in urban cities is more developed than in villages. Further, occupation and income data are available for urban residents in the CHIP 2002, which gives researchers the opportunity to examine the impact of family class background on income besides family assets. This paper begins by analyzing the association between family class status on CCP membership and educational attainments for urban respondents. I demonstrate that individuals with poor and revolutionary class origins are more likely to obtain CCP membership and achieve a higher degree of educational attainment while the discriminatory policy was formally in effect. Even after the abolition of the class systems in 1979, individuals with the revolutionary class background are still more likely to be permitted to join CCP. The descendents of the rich who received education after the late 1970s were more likely to achieve a higher degree of educational attainment than all other classes. This association signals their strong preference for education, which was not apparent while social discrimination against 5 them was abolished in the 1970s. Since 1977, the education system returned to meritbased.
This then demonstrates the descendents of the poor and middle class have significantly lower income and family assets per capita than those of the rich class after controlling for the CCP membership, educational attainment, and other characteristics 2. Specifically, individuals with poor class origins have 12% lower monthly income and 27% lower family assets than those with rich class origins. This social experiment that lasted over half century in the PRC provides an example of strong intergenerational transmission of wealth status.
The transmission seems not likely to occur through inheriting physical capital due to the movements of homogenization of income and properties in the first three decades of PRC. Despite the movement of expropriation of merchants and capitalists and nationalization of industrial and commercial enterprises in 1950s, many properties were confiscated but never returned or even destroyed during the movement to "smash the four olds" along with the Cultural Revolution. In the summer of 1966 all over China, the "Red Guards" began to search homes and confiscate properties of the families of "bad" class, i.e. the decedents of the rich class and the middle class, and even of many government officials who were deemed to be anti-party or anti-revolution elements (Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006) . A lot of antiques and art works were destroyed. The diary of a lab technician on August 26, 1966, cited by Macfarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, pp. 118) , documented the situation: "First they targeted capitalists and landlords, but soon they entered cadres' homes and the homes of persons attacked in the movement as well. At this point it is still getting worse, with similar things occurring in factories and enterprises." As 6 documented by an official document in October 1966, the confiscation by "Red Guards" all over China of a total of 65 tons of gold was praised as the "confiscation of the ill-gotten wealth of the exploiting classes" (Wang, 2009) .
After the Cultural Revolution, in some cities such as Shanghai, the government set up the "Bureau for Sorting Looted Goods" to return those confiscated items to their owners, but much of them had probably disappeared due to theft or misplace (Cheng, 1988) . Moreover, it was difficult to find the original owners due to lack of accurate records under the situation of bureaucracy chaos during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, even though the possibility of hiding wealth such as gold, silver, antiques or art works cannot be completely ruled out, it is not likely to play major roles in determining the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Moreover, the story of hiding wealth might help explain the difference in family assets between the rich and the poor, it cannot explain the difference in income once education level is controlled to reduce the impact of wealth on income through education.
The subsequent discussions in this paper are structured as follows. Section II describes the data and measurement of variables. Section III estimates the correlation between family class origins and individuals' CCP membership and educational attainment. Section IV discusses the economic impacts of family class origins.
Section V draws conclusions.
II. Data and Measurement
The data source for this paper is a national cross-sectional survey of Chinese Gustafsson et al. (2008) for more details of the sampling framework and sampling method of the CHIP 2002 survey. 4 Many individuals in urban areas were sent down to rural areas to do manual labour during the Cultural Revolution. Most of them returned to urban areas after the Cultural Revolution. Some literatures show that there is long-term impact of the rustication experience on later life outcomes (Li et al. 2010 , Xie et al. 2008 , Zhou 2010 , and Zhou and Hou 1999 . 5 Since there is a small number of respondents reported zero income or asset, the log of income and asset in this paper is actually the log of one plus income or asset.
8 education for females is expected to be related with their own family class origins. The education of respondents' fathers is categorized into five groups, no school, elementary school, junior high school, senior high school or equivalence, and college.
The data show that the education levels of fathers are generally low, with 63% of them never entered school or just finished elementary school and only 6% had college education. Regarding occupation of the fathers of the male household head, 65.3% are skilled or non-skilled workers and 18.6% are in the cadre group. By contrast, the proportion of individuals having labour work and government jobs is 45.6% and 22.3%, respectively. Thus, the proportion of survey respondents with professional or other white-collar jobs are significantly higher than their fathers.
III. The Discrimination Role of Class Background
9
This section of the paper estimates the impact of family class background on individuals' CCP membership and years of education using cross-sectional regression analysis to illustrate the discrimination role of class background. Logistic regressions are employed for CCP membership model, and OLS regressions are used for all other models. City dummies are included in all the models to control for regional variations in policy and social-economic environment. Standard errors of coefficients are clustered at city level to account for the possible correlation within cities.
Family class origins and CCP membership
CCP membership can be viewed as an investment in political capital, therefore joining it is a decision based on a cost-benefit analysis of private material advantage.
Joining the CCP not only brings more political opportunities and economic benefits (Morduch and Sicular, 2000; Liu, 2003; Appleton et al. 2006; Li et al., 2006) , but it is also one of the few ways of reducing the potential discrimination for individuals with un-favorable class backgrounds. Comparing to the benefits, the costs of joining CCP are small (Appleton et al. 2006) . The main costs for obtaining the membership are those associated with a formal application and participation in study sessions and community service with monitoring. The costs after admission include time devoted to CCP activities, submission to scrutiny and discipline, and a low membership due.
Therefore we can ignore the supply side and focus on the screening of CCP members.
If we observe a negative link between unfavorable class origins and CCP membership, we can fully or at least largely attribute it to the CCP preferences over class background especially before 1979. The study then conducts logistic regressions to examine the correlation between family class origins and CCP membership. Table 4 1931-1940, 1941-1950, 1951-1960, 1961-1970 and 1971-1980 . Table 5 Deng and Treiman (1997) , Giles et al. (2008) , Sato and Li (2008) and Zhou et al. (1998) for more details.
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family class has to invest in education while not being constrained by the discrimination policy.
OLS regressions are then conducted to examine the effect of family class origins on educational attainment. Table 6 
IV. The Economic Impacts of Family Class Origins
This section studies the impact of family class background on personal income and family assets. The subjects are limited to respondents with data on income and occupation. Table 7 shows the summary statistics of personal income by cohorts and classes. For the entire sample, as well as the 1951-1960 and 1961-1980 cohorts, income of individuals from the rich class ranks as the second highest among the four classes. Table 8 presents the family assets per capita by cohorts and classes.
Individuals with revolution class origins consistently have the highest level of assets in across all age cohorts. The family assets of respondents with rich class origins are always higher than those from the poor class. Tables 9 and Table 10 report results from OLS regressions that examine the effects of family class origins on economic outcomes. Table 9 gives the estimated effects of family class origins on the respondent's log of monthly income. The first column presents the regression using all samples of Columns (2) through (4) Respondents who are government officials, professionals, and other white collars have approximately 36%, 37%, and 23% higher income than skilled or non-skilled labourers, respectively. Furthermore, the experience of rustication does not have significant effect on income, as shown in Xie et al. (2008) and Zhou (2010) . second to the fourth models conduct regressions for the 1941-1950, 1951-1960, and 1961-1980 
V. Conclusions
In a radical social experiment the physical capital of wealthy Chinese families was expropriated. The government further imposed a class system to restrict the political and educational rights of the rich for nearly three decades. Family members of the poor and revolutionary class were favored during this period. My analysis does show evidence of discrimination effect: Individuals with poor and revolutionary class 18 origins obtain CCP membership more easily and achieve a higher level of education in the three decades wherein the discriminatory policy was formally in effect.
Moreover, I find that the discrimination effect still exists even the policy was officially abolished. In 1979, China government implemented market-oriented economic reform. The class system and class-based discriminatory policy were also officially abolished. University admissions returned to merit-based enrollment in 1977. The regression results in this paper show that individuals with a revolutionary class background are continue to be more likely to be granted CCP membership even after the abolition of the class system. However, descendents of the poor class no longer enjoyed this political benefit.
The descendents of the rich who received education after the late 1970s were more likely to achieve a higher level of education than all other classes, after controlling for fathers' education, occupation, and CCP membership. These results could indicate their strong preference over education. Once the social discrimination against them was abolished and the education system returned to merit-based, invested more on education. 5 1931-1940 1941-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 Elementary 
